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SEX OFFENDERS, CUSTODY AND HABEAS
WENDY R. CALAWAY†
INTRODUCTION
The conventional rhetoric surrounding discussions of habeas
corpus, as the great instrument for the protection of freedom,
often ignores the realities of how access to habeas corpus is
granted or, more importantly, denied. The legislature has taken
great efforts to limit state petitioners’ access to the federal
courts.1 Generally, courts have enforced the procedural rules and
regulations, making access to courts for state petitioners
cumbersome and complicated;2 however, in at least one respect,
the jurisdictional requirement of custody, courts have taken a
more liberal view.
To obtain federal habeas review of a petitioner’s state
conviction, the petitioner must be in custody.3 The Supreme
Court’s determination of the meaning of the custody requirement
has revolved around restraints on liberty.4 Petitioners need not
be physically confined to demonstrate custody, but must suffer
significant restraints on their liberty.5 Using this paradigm, the
Supreme Court has extended the definition of custody to those on
parole, those on probation, and those out on bond awaiting trial.6
Lower courts have extended this reasoning even further;7

†
Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Cincinnati Blue Ash,
J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law. Professor Calaway represented the
petitioner in the case, Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2018), one of
the latest cases from the circuit courts on the issue of whether a petitioner under a
sex offender registration law is in custody for purposes of habeas review.
1
Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default,
Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1103, 1111–12 (1999) (discussing legislative limitations on access to habeas relief).
2
See generally Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas
Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868 (1997).
3
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
4
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239–40 (1963).
5
Id. at 242–43.
6
Id.
7
E.g., Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 1997)
(finding that 500 hours of community service performed by the petitioner constituted
custody).
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however, courts have failed to apply the custody requirement to
sex offenders seeking habeas review in a coherent, realistic
manner.
Most courts have determined that once a person’s prison
sentence has expired, she is no longer considered to be in custody
for purposes of habeas review, even if she has to comply with sex
offender requirements.8 Using a variety of standards and factors,
courts have determined that the sex offender requirements are
not significant restraints on physical liberty.9 In doing so, courts
have failed to consider the particulars of the sex offender
legislation compared to those of other jurisdictions and have
failed to consider the data produced by social scientists on the
implications of the sex offender designation. The reality is that
sex offenders from many states are burdened by restrictions and
requirements far more onerous than individuals on probation or
parole. Further, like individuals on probation or parole, sex
offenders are subject to severe criminal penalties for violation of
the requirements. Failure to acknowledge these realities leads to
a result that is required by neither Supreme Court precedent nor
by the habeas statute.
This Article focuses on habeas petitioners under a conviction
from state court seeking federal habeas review. First, Part I will
discuss the historical context of the writ of habeas corpus and the
development of its purpose and scope. Part I also examines the
current status of habeas corpus law, recent legislative efforts to
limit its reach, and, specifically, the idea of custody as a
prerequisite to habeas relief. Part II explores the evolution of the
custody requirement both at the Supreme Court and in lower
federal courts. In particular, this section looks at how the
meaning of custody has evolved over time from physical custody
to more intangible restrictions on liberty. Part III addresses the
application of custody jurisprudence to the issue of sex offenders.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, but
several circuit courts have, and Part III addresses the
implications of these decisions. Part IV examines sex offender
legislation by discussing the particulars of various state statutes
and reviewing social science research regarding the effect of the
legislative requirements. Finally, Part V looks at the standard
applied by courts when discussing sex offender designation as

8
9

See, e.g., Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id.
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“custody.” This Article argues that the standard has shifted and
been analyzed inconsistently. The conclusion contends that,
consistent with Supreme Court and lower court precedent on the
issue of custody, individuals in many states subject to sex
offender laws suffer significant restraints on their liberty and,
therefore, meet the jurisdictional requirement for habeas review.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF HABEAS CORPUS

Often considered “the most celebrated writ in the English
law”10 and “[t]he most important human rights provision in the
Constitution,”11 the writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries
esteemed as the preeminent means by which people of a free
society maintain their liberty.12 Chief Justice Salmon Chase
characterized habeas as “the best and only sufficient defence of
personal freedom.”13 The idea of habeas corpus traces its roots to
England in the thirteenth century.14 At its most basic, habeas
corpus provides a mechanism for a criminal defendant to be
physically present before the court.15 The traditions in England
connected habeas corpus not to concepts of liberty, but to a
mechanism for having the defendant in court to answer for
charges.16 The historical purpose and scope of the law of habeas
corpus in England has been well documented elsewhere;17
however, the development of habeas corpus in the United States
has diverged from the historical underpinnings in England.
Rather than using habeas corpus as a mechanism for securing a
defendant’s appearance in court, the concept of habeas corpus in
the United States has been used by defendants to secure their
liberty.18 Habeas corpus is enshrined in the United States
10

See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution,
32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1952).
12
Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996) (quoting Ex parte Yerger, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868)).
13
Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 95.
14
See, e.g., 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN A.D. 1200–1225, at 67 (n.p., Frederic
W. Maitland ed., Selden Soc’y 1887); 8 CURIA REGIS ROLLS 308 (C.T. Flower ed.,
1938) (1219–1220).
15
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 591–94 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d
ed. 1898).
16
ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 14, 20 (1960).
17
See JUDITH FARBEY & R. J. SHARPE WITH SIMON ATRILL, THE LAW OF HABEAS
CORPUS 1, 18 (3d ed. 2011).
18
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–40 (2008).
11
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Constitution as a mechanism of review for cases of illegal
confinement;19 thus, habeas corpus became less of a tool to
compel the behavior of defendants and more of an instrument for
defendants to compel the action of the courts. Through this shift
habeas corpus became, in theory, the great protector of individual
liberty.
Article I, § 9 of the United States Constitution provides that
“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”20 The writ’s purpose is to provide a
mechanism for individuals to hold the government accountable
for violations of the law.21 At first, the right to habeas corpus
existed only for cases in which a federal petitioner was
imprisoned22 or the jurisdiction of the court was challenged.23
But, in 1867, Congress extended federal habeas corpus protection
to prisoners held in state custody.24 The Supreme Court noted
the breadth of habeas protection, finding that Congress extended
habeas corpus jurisdiction to “every court and of every judge
every possible case” of liberty deprivation.25 Historically, courts
explicitly and tacitly acknowledged the importance of habeas
corpus, expanding both the access and the scope of the writ.26

19
See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1040 (1970); see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress
over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in
Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1016–23 (1924).
20
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
21
See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325–26 (1867).
22
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477–78 (1991) (citing Ex parte Wells, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 307, 307 (1855)).
23
Id. (citing Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201–03 (1830)).
24
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–55 (2012), partially invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008)).
25
McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 325–26.
26
See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 325–29 (1915); Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1879) (explaining jurisdictional limitations where charges
were based on a statute later found unconstitutional); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 176–78 (1873); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term—
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 103–04 (1959)
(detailing the “process of expansion of the concept of a lack of jurisdiction.”); see
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.1, at 940–41, § 15.2, at
947–52 (7th ed. 2016) (discussing the changes in constitutional interpretation that
led to a new habeas law); Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great
Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557, 564–566 (1994) (outlining the Supreme Court precedent
that expanded the scope of habeas corpus relief).
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However, reference to more recent congressional action and
Supreme Court jurisprudence has repeatedly imposed new
procedural hurdles and restricted availability of habeas review.27
The statute of limitations requires that petitioners file within one
year of when the conviction becomes final in state court or when
the time for seeking such review expires.28 Petitioners must
exhaust all claims in state court before they are presented in a
federal habeas petition.29 Exhaustion requires petitioners to
provide the state’s highest court with an opportunity to review
both the factual basis and the constitutional principle underlying
the claim.30 When a claim has not first been presented in state
court, it is procedurally defaulted and barred from review in
federal court.31 Even when these procedural hurdles are cleared,
the standard of review for habeas claims is narrow. Federal
habeas relief cannot be granted unless a petitioner demonstrates
that the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law,” or “resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented.”32
In addition to these statutory
requirements, the availability of habeas relief is curtailed by the
jurisdictional requirement that the petitioner be in custody at the
time the petition is filed.33

27

See, e.g., The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and the Preservation of
Judicial Review: Federal Court Treatment of the New Habeas Provisions, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1578, 1578 (1998); Margolis, supra note 26, at 574, 576–77; Frank J.
Remington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on the
Altars of Expediency, Federalism and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
339, 339–40 (1987–88); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362, 362–64 (1991); Jordan Steiker, Restructuring PostConviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners:
Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315,
325, 328; Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 9, 13–14, 32–33 (1990). Those convicted in both state court and
federal court have the ability to seek habeas review, however, the procedural
restrictions and requirements are different. This Article focuses on state habeas
petitioners.
28
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2012).
29
Id. § 2254(b)(1). See also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006).
30
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (per curiam); Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 514–15 (1982).
31
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83–84 (1977).
32
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
33
Id. § 2254(a).
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Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state defendant
who challenges the fact or duration of her confinement and seeks
release.34 Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners to
correct violations of the United States Constitution, federal laws,
or treaties of the United States.35 To obtain relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the petitioner must be in custody.36 The
term custody encompasses not only individuals subject to
immediate physical imprisonment, but also those subject to
restraints that significantly confine and restrain freedom and are
not shared by the public generally.37 Each claim in a petition
must satisfy the custody requirement.38
Courts determine
whether a habeas corpus petitioner is in custody for purposes of
§§ 2241 and 2254 at the time that the petition is filed.39
“Although [the] petitioner’s release from custody subsequent to
the filing of the complaint may render his case moot,” such a
release does not impact the threshold question of custody.40
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF CUSTODY
The earliest interpretations of custody required that a
petitioner be physically confined.41 The Court’s interpretation
relied on the literal translation of habeas corpus, “you have the
body,” and thus, it was necessary to have the body in order to
release it.42 As time evolved, so did the Court’s interpretation of
the custody requirement. In Jones v. Cunningham, the Court
held that the right to habeas corpus should not be constricted by
this ritualistic formula.43 The Court was careful to specifically
declare the importance of habeas corpus in protecting individuals

34

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
36
Id.
37
See Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Children’s Serv. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 508–10
(1982); see also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239–43 (1963).
38
Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2003); United States
v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 2002); United States. v. Hatten, 167 F.3d 884,
887 (5th Cir. 1999); Barnickel v. United States, 113 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997).
39
See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d
262, 268 (6th Cir. 1984).
40
Sevier, 742 F.2d at 268–69.
41
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1885). See 1 BRIAN R. MEANS,
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 7:2 (2018 ed.), for a general discussion of the history
and development of the custody requirement.
42
CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE ix (2006).
43
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
35
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against instrusions on their liberty.44 In this case, the Court
determined a petitioner on parole satisfied the custody
requirement.45
There, the petitioner was convicted and
sentenced to ten years in prison because it was his third
offense.46 He challenged his status as a third time offender,
alleging that one of the three prior convictions was invalid.47
While the case was pending, he was paroled and placed under the
custody of the parole board with certain terms and conditions to
follow.48 He was required to live at a certain address, to obtain
permission before moving or leaving the jurisdiction, to allow the
parole officer to visit his home or place of employment, and to
follow the parole officer’s “instructions and advice.”49 He was
subject to potential reincarceration for violation of the conditions
of parole.50 The court of appeals dismissed the case as moot
because the petitioner was no longer in custody;51 however, the
Supreme Court overturned, finding that the conditions of parole
significantly restricted the petitioner’s “liberty to do those things
which in this country free men are entitled to do.”52
Subsequent to Jones, the Court decided a series of cases
addressing the timing of the custody requirement rather than the
conditions that qualify as custody.53 For example, in Carafas v.
LaVallee, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas relief while he
was incarcerated, but his sentence expired while the petition was
pending.54 The government relied on Parker v. Ellis in arguing
that the expiration of the sentence invalidates federal

44

Id. Historically speaking, the requirement that a petitioner be in custody for
purposes of habeas relief has been one that the Court was willing to construe
liberally. Even when the Warren Court gave rise to the Rehnquist Court, and
legislative access to habeas corpus relief became narrower, the Court generally made
allowances in interpreting the meaning of custody. See Yale L. Rosenberg, The
Federal Habeas Corpus Custody Decisions: Liberal Oasis or Conservative Prop?, 23
AM. J. CRIM. L. 99, 101–02 (1995).
45
Jones, 317 U.S. at 243.
46
Id. at 237.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 242.
51
Id. at 237–38.
52
Id. at 243.
53
See Garrett Ordower, Comment, Gone, but Not Forgotten? Habeas Corpus for
Necessary Predicate Offenses, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1837, 1842–55 (2009) (discussing
the evolution of the custody requirement).
54
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
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jurisdiction.55 In Parker, the Supreme Court explicitly held that
when a prisoner is released from prison, after serving his
sentence, the federal habeas case is moot.56 In reassessing this
holding in Carafas, the Court emphatically rejected the notion
that the petitioner’s claims became moot.57 The Court noted that,
consequent to the conviction, the petitioner could not engage in
certain business, serve as an official of a labor union, vote in
state elections, or serve as a juror.58 As a result of the
“disabilities or burdens (which) may flow from [the] petitioner’s
conviction, he has a substantial stake in the judgment of
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence
imposed on him.”59 The Court reversed the decision in Parker
and determined that a petitioner satisfies the custody
requirement if he is in custody at the time the petition is filed.60
In Peyton v. Rowe, the Court also addressed the issue of
custody as it relates to the timing of the petition.61 In this case,
the petitioner was sentenced to serve thirty years for a rape
conviction.62 He subsequently pled guilty to felonious abduction
and was sentenced to serve a twenty-year sentence consecutive to
the thirty-year sentence for the rape conviction.63 The petitioner
filed a habeas petition challenging the felonious abduction
conviction on double jeopardy grounds but did not challenge the
rape conviction.64
Following Supreme Court precedent in
McNally v. Hill,65 the district court dismissed the petition in
Peyton, finding that the petitioner was not in custody because he
55

Id. at 237.
Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 575 (1960), overruled by Carafas, 391 U.S. 234
(1968).
57
Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237.
58
Id.
59
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S.
211, 222 (1946)). The Court’s discussion of these collateral consequences was
provided to refute the argument that the petitioner’s claims were moot. The Court’s
decision regarding custody seemed to hinge on when the petition was filed, meaning
that at the time the petition was filed, he was in prison. Id. at 236–37. Because he
was in custody at the time of filing, the Court retained jurisdiction even if he was
later released. Id. at 237–38.
60
See id. at 239–40.
61
391 U.S. 54, 55 (1968).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 55–56.
64
Id. at 56.
65
293 U.S. 131, 133–36 (1934) (holding that a petitioner sentenced to serve a
third conviction consecutive to the first two was not in custody for habeas review
because he had not yet begun to serve the third prison term and was not challenging
the convictions for counts one and two).
56
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had not begun to serve the felonious abduction sentence he
sought to challenge.66 Considering both judicial economy and
practicality, the Court overruled McNally and held that “a
prisoner serving consecutive sentences is ‘in custody’ [for] any
one of them for purposes of” habeas relief.67
In addition, the Court addressed the issue of where a
petitioner must be located to meet the statutory requirement for
custody. The statute dictates that jurisdiction to review a habeas
petition is limited to the petitioner and must be filed by persons
physically present within the territorial limits of the district
court.68 In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, the petitioner
was imprisoned in Alabama at the time he filed the petition in
the Western District of Kentucky.69 His habeas petition alleged a
denial of his right to a speedy trial on a three-year-old case
pending in Kentucky.70 Again relying on considerations of
practicality—time, convenience, and expense—the Court rejected
a “slavish” interpretation of § 2241(a).71 The Court held that the
petitioner’s filing in the Western District of Kentucky did not
deprive the court of jurisdiction.72 This case affirmed the Court’s
approach to the custody requirement as liberal—not bound by a
technical reading of the statute.
Ten years after Jones, the Court again examined the
substantive question of what it means to be in custody for
purposes of habeas review. In 1973, the Court reviewed a case

66

Peyton, 391 U.S. at 56.
Id. at 67.
68
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012).
69
410 U.S. 484, 485 (1973).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 499.
72
Id. at 500. In making this determination, the Court declined to follow Ahrens
v. Clark, which held that the court’s jurisdiction is confined to a petitioner who is
confined in the jurisdiction where he seeks relief. Id. at 499–500; Ahrens v. Clark,
335 U.S. 188, 192–93 (1948). The Court cited Peyton, Carafas, and Jones, noting:
[C]ritical development since our decision in Ahrens is the emergence of new
classes of prisoners who are able to petition for habeas corpus because of
the adoption of a more expansive definition of the “custody” requirement of
the habeas statute. The overruling of McNally v. Hill made it possible for
prisoners in custody under one sentence to attack a sentence which they
had not yet begun to serve. And it also enabled a petitioner held in one
State to attack a detainer lodged against him by another State. In such a
case, the State holding the prisoner in immediate confinement acts as
agent for the demanding State, and the custodian State is presumably
indifferent to the resolution of the prisoner’s attack on the detainer.
Braden, 410 U.S. at 498–99 (italics added) (internal citations omitted).
67

764

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:755

where the defendant was out on a recognizance bond73 pending
the imposition of a sentence after a conviction for a misdemeanor
offense.74 After exhausting his state remedies, the petitioner
sought relief from his conviction in federal district court. The
district court denied the petition and the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
finding that release on his own recognizance pending execution of
sentence was not custody for purposes of habeas review.75 In
reversing this decision, the Supreme Court noted that a
recognizance bond carried certain terms and conditions that
restricted the freedom of the petitioner.76 Specifically, the Court
noted that the petitioner was required to appear at all times and
places required by the court and could be rearrested at any
time.77 In finding that this qualifies as custody, the Court
reasoned that the petitioner was “subject to restraints ‘not
shared by the public generally.’ ”78 The Court went on to note
that he could not move about as he pleased and that his freedom
depended on the decisions of judicial officers.79 The Court went
to some lengths to specifically limit the scope of the holding in
Hensley v. Municipal Court, emphasizing that the decision did
not extend to those on a recognizance bond awaiting trial;80
however, this case did signal an expansion of the habeas doctrine
well beyond that previously envisaged.
In Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to examine just how far the Hensley
decision would reach.81 The petitioner faced retrial on charges,
which he alleged constituted double jeopardy.82 The petitioner
was out on a recognizance bond while challenging the validity of

73
The recognizance bond did not require the payment of money. The defendant
was released on his promise to appear in court. Failure to appear for court hearings
when directed could result in the revocation of the recognizance bond and the
defendant’s incarceration pending the resolution of the case.
74
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 346–47 (1973).
75
Id. at 345–46.
76
Id. at 351–53.
77
Id. at 351–52.
78
Id. at 351 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 353.
81
See 466 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1984). Both the district court and the First Circuit
agreed that petitioner met the jurisdictional threshold and agreed that retrial was
barred by double jeopardy. Id. at 299–300. The Supreme Court upheld the custody
determination, however, reversing the circuit court’s determination that double
jeopardy barred a retrial. Id. at 301, 303.
82
Id. at 296–97.
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a second trial in state and federal court.83 The state challenged
the federal court’s jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition,
alleging that the petitioner was not in custody.84
Notwithstanding the Court’s limiting language in Hensley, the
Lydon Court ruled that the petitioner’s status, on recognizance,
awaiting retrial, satisfied the custody requirement.85 The Court
analogized the petitioner’s circumstances to those of the
petitioner in Hensley, finding that they were not identical, but
not “sufficiently different to require a different result.”86 Quoting
Hensley, the Lydon Court found that the petitioner satisfied the
custody requirements because he was subject to “restraints not
shared by the public generally.”87
After expanding and refining the definition of “custody” for
several years, in 1989 the Supreme Court pulled back in Maleng
v. Cook.88 In Maleng, the Court addressed a situation where the
petitioner was sentenced to serve a prison term, the length of
which had been enhanced by a prior conviction.89 The petitioner
attempted to attack the prior conviction in a federal habeas
petition. The issue the Court addressed was whether a habeas
petitioner remains in custody under a conviction for which the
sentence has expired because of the possibility that it may be
used to enhance a sentence imposed for a future crime.90 The
Court acknowledged that it had historically taken a liberal view
of the custody requirement, but drew the line at sentences that
had completely expired by the time the habeas petition was
filed.91 The Court reasoned that it had “never extended [custody]
to the situation where a habeas petitioner suffers no present
restraint from a conviction.”92 The Court, however, was careful to
contrast Maleng with Carafas.
In Carafas, the Court noted that even though the petitioner’s
conviction expired, he was still subject to collateral consequences
as a result of his conviction: inability to vote; to serve on juries;

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 297–98.
See id. at 300.
Id. at 300–01.
Id. at 301.
Id. (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)).
See 490 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1989) (per curiam).
Id. at 489–90.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
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and to engage in other business;93 however, the Court in Maleng
specified that the custody decision in Carafas rested on timing of
when the petition was filed, not on the collateral consequences
suffered by the petitioner.94 In Carafas, the petitioner filed his
petition before he was released from prison.95 In contrast, the
petitioner in Maleng did not file his petition until the conviction
had expired, so notwithstanding the collateral consequences of
his conviction—including future sentencing enhancements—he
did not meet the custody requirements.96 As will be discussed in
detail below, it is the Court’s decision in Maleng, to the exclusion
of the other Supreme Court precedent discussed here, that
interpreting courts have used to deny relief to sex offenders
seeking habeas review.97
In Garlotte v. Fordice, the petitioner sought to thread a
needle similar to the petitioner in Maleng, but reached a more
favorable result.98 In this case, the petitioner challenged a
marijuana conviction, which had expired at the time the habeas
petition was filed.99 The petitioner was concerned the marijuana
conviction would delay his parole eligibility on charges for which
he was currently serving a prison sentence.100 Rather than
adhering to Maleng, the Court relied on Peyton in finding that
the petitioner satisfied the custody requirement.101 The Court
cited Peyton and reaffirmed the commitment to the constitutional
protections of habeas corpus review.102 The petitioner in Garlotte
was serving consecutive sentences like the petitioner in Peyton.
The distinguishing feature between these two cases was that, in
Garlotte, the petitioner’s conviction had expired, and he was
serving time on unrelated but consecutive sentences. In contrast,
the petitioner in Peyton challenged a conviction that he was going
to serve in the future while he served time on unrelated,
consecutive sentences.103
The Garlotte Court held that
93

See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968).
See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492–93. Again, the Court drew a distinction between
whether a petitioner’s argument is moot and whether a petitioner is in custody for
habeas purposes.
95
Carafas, 391 U.S. at 236.
96
Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490–91.
97
See infra notes 243–61 and accompanying text.
98
515 U.S. 39, 45–46 (1995).
99
Id. at 42–43.
100
Id. at 41.
101
Id. at 45–46.
102
Id. at 44.
103
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 55–58 (1968).
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consecutive sentences were viewed in the aggregate and that the
petitioner was in custody.104 While this seems to be a departure
from Maleng, leaving the door open for federal review of
convictions that have fully expired, courts have not extended this
analysis to those affected by sex offender statutory requirements.
In summarizing what it means to be in custody for purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, historically, both the Supreme Court and
lower courts have taken a broad view. Certainly, incarceration
pursuant to the conviction or sentence challenged in the petition
satisfies the custody requirement;105 however, incarceration is not
required to establish custody, and courts have made the
determination that the custody requirement is satisfied on far
less serious infringements of a person’s liberty.106 As discussed
above, a release on a personal recognizance bond without the
obligation to post a financial surety, pending retrial, is
considered custody because the restraints on the petitioner’s
liberty were significant.107 The obligations imposed on the
petitioner subjected him to “restraints ‘not shared by the public
generally.’ ”108 Further, the petitioner is considered in custody
when he is released on his own recognizance―between conviction
and the imposition of sentence.109
In addition to those awaiting trial or sentencing, those on
probation or parole are also considered to be in custody.110 The
custody requirement has been expanded to include those serving
consecutive sentences, and habeas petitions may proceed when a
petitioner is challenging a sentence scheduled to run first, even if
104

Garlotte, 515 U.S. at 41.
See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 715–16 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even incarceration on convictions not
being challenged in the instant petition can satisfy the custody requirement where
the petitioner seeks to prevent a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. See Wilson v.
Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 821–24 (9th Cir. 2009).
106
Wilson, 554 F.3d at 822.
107
Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1984).
108
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (quoting Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).
109
See id. at 349, 351.
110
Jones, 371 U.S. at 241–43 (holding that parole satisfies the custody
requirement); Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that
probation and deferred probation orders satisfy the in custody requirement);
Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[The petitioner] remains under
supervised probation. Thus, he is still sufficiently ‘in custody’ to pursue federal
habeas relief.” (citing Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1987))); Malinovsky
v. Court of Common Pleas, 7 F.3d 1263, 1265 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Malinovsky is in
custody, although he has been released on a personal recognizance bond.”).
105
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it has already expired.111 Likewise, those who have been
sentenced to community service112 or rehabilitation programs,113
have faced deportation,114 or have suspended or stayed sentences
are considered to be in custody.115 The Supreme Court has
defined custody as a restriction imposed, which “significantly
restrain[s] [a] petitioner’s liberty to do those things which in this
country free men are entitled to do.”116 The following Parts will
examine how this precedent is applied to those under sex
offender laws.
III. SEX OFFENDER LAWS AND CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
Despite the expansive position taken with regard to the
application of the custody requirement, courts have almost
universally refused to extend the custody requirement to those
under a sex offender registration.117 This trend started early in
the circuit courts’ review of habeas petitions filed by sex
offenders seeking review of their convictions in state court. In
Williamson v. Gregoire, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in
a case involving restrictions imposed under Megan’s Law.118 The
court determined that the obligations and restraints imposed by
the sex offender designation amounted to collateral consequences
of the conviction.119 The court focused analysis on the restraints
on the petitioner’s liberty, noting that the statute at issue did not
require in person registration, did not contain any prohibitions
111

Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 46–47 (1995).
Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 1997).
113
Dow v. Circuit Court, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
114
Mustata v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022–23 (6th Cir. 1999).
115
McVeigh v. Smith, 872 F.2d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Hensley v.
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348–49 (1973)).
116
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
117
Bonser v. Dist. Att’y Monroe Cty., 659 F. App’x 126, 128–29 (3d Cir. 2016);
Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 692–94 (10th Cir. 2016); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen.
of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338
(4th Cir. 2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717–20 (7th Cir. 2008); Leslie v.
Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521–24 (6th Cir. 2002); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019
(9th Cir. 2001); McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam);
Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Dickey v.
Patton, No. Civ-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2015)
(report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10,
2015). But see Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 16-4175, 2019 WL 960003, at
*6–7 (3rd Cir. Feb. 27, 2019).
118
151 F.3d at 1182–84. Megan’s Law has generally been superseded by the
Adam Walsh Act, discussed in more detail below. See infra notes 168–70 and
accompanying text.
119
Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184.
112

2018]

SEX OFFENDERS, CUSTODY AND HABEAS

769

on where the petitioner was allowed to go, and did not impose
obligations demanding his presence at any place at any time.120
Under the Washington statute, “registration [could] be
accomplished by mail.”121 In Williamson, the court thoroughly
examined the sex offender statute and discussed the implications
of its restrictions.122 Because the statute did not have any
restrictions on where the petitioner could loiter, travel, live, or
move, the court determined that it did not contain restraints on
liberty significant enough to qualify as custody.123 As the
following discussion will demonstrate, subsequent courts have
relied on the reasoning of Williamson, without applying the
custody standard to the particular statute at issue. This has
resulted in a body of jurisprudence that treats sex offender
requirements as collateral consequences and as civil or remedial
rather than punitive;124 however, as sex offender legislation has
become more burdensome, restrictive, and punitive, the legal
analysis has failed to keep pace.
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this analytic
trend.125 In Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, the petitioner, a high
school teacher, was convicted in state court for having
consensual, but unlawful, sexual contact with a student.126 She
was sentenced to serve two years in prison and, as part of her
sentence, was classified under Ohio’s sex offender statute as a
Tier III sex offender.127 The petitioner served a portion of her
prison sentence and was released on community control while
her appeal was pending.128
She exhausted state remedies
challenging her conviction and sentence and finally filed a
petition for habeas relief in federal court.129 Prior to filing the
habeas petition, the community control requirements were
satisfied and discharged, but she still remained subject to the
requirements of the Tier III sex offender designation.130 The
120

Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1184.
122
Id. at 1181–82, 1184.
123
Id. at 1183–84.
124
See, e.g., Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014);
Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 720 (7th Cir. 2008); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518,
523 (6th Cir. 2002); McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
125
See Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 2018).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 739–40.
130
Id. at 739.
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respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the petitioner
did not meet the jurisdictional requirements for habeas relief
because she was not in custody as required by 29 U.S.C. § 2241.
The petitioner argued that the sex offender designation
requirements were custodial for purposes of the statute.131 On
appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the petitioner argued that the sex
offender designation posed significant restraints on her liberty.
Previous iterations of sex offender legislation included
registration requirements; however, new versions of sex offender
designation schemes had been enacted in Ohio and elsewhere
with far more burdensome requirements.132 Under the current
Ohio statute, the petitioner was subject to the following
restrictions: She was prohibited from establishing a residence
within 1,000 feet of a school, daycare or preschool; designated
permanently as a sexual predator; mandated to register in
person every ninety days, in each county where she worked, lived
and went to school; required to divulge certain personal
identifiers and information, which would be publicly disclosed;
forced to disclose to the sheriff her address to verify housing
information with the landlord; and prohibited from travelling
outside the jurisdiction for more than three days without going to
the sheriff in that county and registering.133 Further, these were
lifetime requirements, which were part of the criminal sentence,
imposed by the sentencing court.134 If the petitioner failed to
comply, she was subject to a felony charge carrying a potential
three-year prison sentence.135
The petitioner argued that these restrictions constituted
significant restraints on her liberty as contemplated in Jones v.
Cunningham;136 however, the court determined that she had not
demonstrated that Ohio’s residency restrictions amounted to
governmental control over her movements.137 In rejecting the
petitioner’s claim, the court distinguished between a parolee—
whose restrictions and punishment are based on his original
131
Id. at 742–44. The petitioner urged the court to overrule its previous decision
in Leslie v. Randle because the Ohio sex offender laws had changed since that
decision. Id. She also argued that the new laws imposed more significant restraints
on the freedoms of designees. Id. The district court dismissed the petition. Id.
132
See Brief of Appellant at 9, Hautzenroeder, 887 F.3d 737 (No. 17-3395).
133
Id. at 17–21.
134
Id. at 21.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 22; Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1963).
137
Hautzenroeder, 887 F.3d at 741.
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conviction—and someone convicted under the Ohio sex offender
laws—whose punishment would be based on a new offense.138 In
doing so, the Sixth Circuit followed its prior decisions on this
issue as well as other circuit courts on sex offender
registration.139
In Wilson v. Flaherty, a previous case with even more
troubling implications, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue on
facts involving claims of actual innocence.140
There, the
petitioner was a part of the “Norfolk Four,” a group of four navy
sailors convicted of the rape and the murder of another sailor’s
wife.141
The court acquitted the petitioner of murder but
convicted him of rape; he was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment and required to comply with the state’s sex
offender laws.142 After completing his prison sentence, evidence
came to light that called the validity of the petitioner’s conviction
into serious question.143 Forensic evidence revealed another
individual as the most likely perpetrator of the crimes.144
Further, the post-conviction evidence suggested police
misconduct significantly contributed to the petitioner’s wrongful
conviction.145 By the time this evidence came to light, the
petitioner had served his prison sentence but remained a
designated sex offender, which involved lifetime obligations
requiring him to regularly provide detailed personal information
to the government and, among other things, limiting where he
may live and travel.146 Finding that the sex offender registration
requirements did not have a substantial impact on petitioner’s
liberty, the Fourth Circuit found that the petitioner was not in

138

Id.
Id. at 743–44 (citing Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (10th Cir.
2016); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014); Wilson v.
Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2012); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 523 (6th
Cir. 2002); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 1999); Dickey v.
Patton, No. Civ-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2015)
(report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10,
2015)).
140
689 F.3d at 339.
141
Id. at 333.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 334.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 333–35 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-903 to -904 (West 2018)).
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custody, holding that “[t]o rule otherwise would drastically
expand the writ of habeas corpus beyond its traditional purview
and render [the] ‘in custody’ requirement meaningless.”147
Dissenting, Judge Wynn noted concerns about the
petitioner’s strong claims of actual innocence and disagreed with
“the majority opinion’s contention that the deprivations on
liberty incident to [the petitioner’s] sexual offender registration
requirements [were] too trivial and too collateral to satisfy the
requirement that a habeas petitioner be in custody.”148 In
addition, he argued that the petitioner was “subject to a litany of
in-person reporting requirements . . . that demand[ed] his
presence at a particular place and particular time, and such
obligations w[ould] extend the duration of [his] natural life.”149
Although this decision drew wide criticism, the Supreme Court
declined to hear the case.150
In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit revisited the issue of
custody and sex offenders in Dickey v. Allbaugh.151 In this case,
the petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma of child sex abuse and
sought review of his conviction in a federal habeas petition.152
The petitioner argued that the restrictions imposed by
Oklahoma’s statutory scheme were far more burdensome than
those in Calhoun.153 For example, unlike the petitioner in
Calhoun, the petitioner here was forbidden from working with
children or at a school and was prohibited from living within
2,000 feet of a school, playground, park, or child-care center.154
Despite the significant differences in the statutory schemes in
Calhoun and Dickey, the court cited its holding in Calhoun in
denying dismissing the petition.155 The court found that the sex
offender
obligations and
restrictions were
“collateral
147

Id. at 338.
Id. at 344–45 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
149
Id. at 346.
150
See, e.g., J. Clay Douglas, The “Innocence and Redressability” Exception: A
Fair Alternative to Habeas Jurisprudence's Direct Versus Collateral Consequence
Dichotomy, 92 N.C. L. REV. 690, 709, 712, 716 (2014); Recent Case, Wilson v.
Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 2105, 2105, 2109–10
(2013). See also Wilson v. Flaherty, 570 U.S. 917 (2013).
151
664 F. App’x 690, 691–92 (10th Cir. 2016).
152
Id.
153
Id. at 692–93. See also Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 754 F.3d 1070, 1074
(holding that the Colorado sex offender statutory requirements did not give rise to
custody for habeas purposes); Brief of Appellant at 16, Dickey, 664 Fed. App’x 690
(No. 15-6234).
154
Brief of Appellant, supra note 153, at 16.
155
Dickey, 664 F. App’x at 693–94.
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consequences of [the] conviction and not a continuation of
punishment.”156 In reaching this decision, the court found that
the petitioner retained the same freedom of movement and
association enjoyed by those not under the restrictions.157 As will
be discussed below, these conclusions are patently at odds with
the restrictions, obligations, and punishments regulating the
conduct of sex offenders.
The disconnect between the conclusions drawn by courts and
the realities faced by the individuals laboring under sex offender
restrictions was recognized by the Third Circuit in Piasecki v.
Court of Common Pleas.158 There the court found that the
majority of cases analyzing sex offender registration schemes did
so under older versions of statutes that were less onerous than
those at issue today.159 The sex offender requirements imposed
under the statute in Pennsylvania included in person
registration every ninety days and for other events, such as
changing residences, beginning a new job or getting a new car.160
The Pennsylvania statute also required preapproval for
The sex offender designation was
international travel.161
included as part of the sentence.162 The Piasecki court found that
these restrictions were significant restraints on the petitioner’s
liberty.163
IV. EXAMINING THE LAW AND CONSEQUENCES OF
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
Sex offender registration laws and regulations were
originally enacted in an effort to reduce the prevalence of sexual
crimes.164 Originally, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
156

Id. at 694.
Id. at 693.
158
No. 16-4175, 2019 WL 960003, at *11 (3rd Cir. Feb. 27, 2019).
159
Id. at *7.
160
Id. at *1–2.
161
Id. at *2.
162
Id. at *1.
163
Id. at *8.
164
Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual
Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 413 (2010). These laws appear
to have been adopted, at least in part, based on the idea that sex offenders recidivate
at higher rates than other offenders. Id. This assumption has been called into
question. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale
of Criminal Laws that Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 57–58 (2010);
Wayne A. Logan, Megan’s Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 371, 393–95 (2011) (explaining the factors that may account for the claim of
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Children Act and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act
were created to help law enforcement officials track sex offenders
and decrease the likelihood that they would recidivate.165 Under
these regulatory laws, convicted sex offenders were obligated to
register and verify their current names and addresses with local
police.166 Megan’s Law followed, amending the initial law and
focusing on creating public access to registration information.167
The Adam Walsh Act, enacted approximately eleven years later,
made sweeping changes to registration, reporting, information
collection requirements, and penalties.168 States were required to
adopt certain portions of this federal law or risk losing access to
certain federal funds.169 While sex offender registration laws
have not been uniformly enacted, the requirements, restrictions,
and penalties are on the books in all fifty states.170
The federal Adam Walsh Act is an example of the kind of sex
offender laws that have been enacted in other jurisdictions. The
Act requires classifying sex offenders by tier based on three
offense levels: lower, moderate, and higher offenses.171 Offenders
must register in all jurisdictions where they live, work, and
attend school.172 These registrations must be verified, once a
year for low-level offenders, twice a year for mid-level offenders
and four times a year for high-level offenders.173 Failure to
register is a felony offense that carries a potential prison
sentence.174 The information that law enforcement collects
higher recidivism rates); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic
Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 382–83 (2005).
165
Logan, supra note 164, at 377–78; see, e.g., Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038–41 (1994), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, sec. 129, § (a), 120 Stat. 587 .
166
Logan, supra note 164, at 373–74.
167
Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, sec. 2, § 170101(d), 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
168
Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of
Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1078
(2011–2012).
169
Id. at 1077.
170
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003). The Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act sets minimum national standards for gathering, updating, and
publicizing information about sex offenders. See 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 (West 2017);
see also Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 434–36 (2012).
171
34 U.S.C.A. § 20911; Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear:
How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 697, 702–03.
172
Enniss, supra note 171, at 704; see also 34 U.S.C.A. § 20913(a).
173
34 U.S.C.A. § 20918.
174
See Enniss, supra note 171, at 702, 705; see also 34 U.S.C.A. § 20913(e).
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includes the offenders’ criminal history, fingerprints, palm
prints, and DNA.175 The registry is publically available on the
Internet and communities are notified of an offender’s
presence.176 Registration requirements remain in effect for
fifteen years for low-level offenders, twenty-five years for midlevel offenders, and life for high-level offenders.177 One of the
more controversial aspects of the Adam Walsh Act is that it
provides sex offender designations and requirements for
juveniles.178 Many states also have restrictions on where sex
offenders are permitted to establish residency.179 The statute
also provides for a civil commitment scheme for those designated
as sex offenders under the Act.180
The practical effect of this legislation is instructive in
analyzing the application of the jurisdictional custody
requirement to individuals under a sex offender designation
law.181 The inability to obtain or maintain housing is among the
175

Enniss, supra note 171, at 704 n.68.
See 34 U.S.C.A. § 20920(a); Enniss, supra note 171, at 701–02.
177
34 U.S.C.A. § 20915(a).
178
See Editorial Board, Sex Offenders Registry Requires Reboot in Ohio and the
Nation: Editorial, CLEVELAND.COM, (Nov. 19, 2015) https://www.cleveland.com/opin
ion/index.ssf/2015/11/sex-offender_registry_requires_reboot_in_ohio_and_the_nation
_editorial.html.
179
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-11 (2018), ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-128, -131
(West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.215
(West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-15 to -17 (West 2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 188331 (West 2018); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150 / 8 (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 11-13-3-4 (West 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.101, 692A.114 (West 2018); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.2 (2018); MICH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. §§ 28.734–28.736 (West 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-35-25 (West 2018);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147 (West 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.16 (West
2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1125 (West 2018); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-202-0040 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-535
(West 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (West 2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4039-211 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.7 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-370.3 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.703 (West
2018); W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 62-12-26 (West 2018), WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-320 (West
2018).
180
Emily Eschenbach Barker, Note, The Adam Walsh Act:
Un-Civil
Commitment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 145–46 (2009). See generally Stephen
C. Dries, Sex Predators and Federal Habeas Corpus: Has the Great Writ Gone
AWOL?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 673 (2006) (discussing the application of the custody
requirement to sex offenders and civil commitments).
181
A range of collateral consequences may accompany any criminal conviction.
Some of these consequences may directly result from the sanction imposed (loss of
voting rights, loss of ability to possess a firearm, deportation, etc.). See generally
Velmer S. Burton, Jr. et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A
National Study of State Statutes, 51 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1987, at 52. Other
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most serious consequences. Empirical research suggests that at
least 44% of individuals subject to a sex offender law reported
that they were unable to live with family members.182 In
addition, 57% said that affordable housing was in short supply,
and 60% reported emotional distress resulting from housing
restrictions.183 For example, in Indiana, 26% of those surveyed
indicated that they were unable to return to their homes after
being released from prison, 37% were unable to live with family;
and close to one-third reported that a landlord refused to rent to
them or to renew a lease agreement.184 Many respondents said
that due to restrictions on where they could live, affordable
housing was less available, and they were forced to live further
away from work, social services, and mental health treatment.185
In addition to the housing difficulties faced by those subject
to sex offender registration laws, many registered sex offenders
have lost jobs and have been subject to harassment or property
damage.186 Policies such as community notification lead to the

collateral consequences, however, are social in nature (stigma, ostracism, financial,
etc.). See Mary Dodge & Mark R. Pogrebin, Collateral Costs of Imprisonment for
Women: Complications of Reintegration, 81 PRISON J. 42, 42–43 (2001). However, the
collateral consequences of a conviction for an individual convicted of a sex-related
criminal offense are particularly acute in all of these areas. Not only are a number of
the collateral consequences written into the sex offender registration statutes, but
the stigma of such a conviction is directed more specifically, by the public, at
defendants with such convictions.
182
Jill S. Levenson & Andrea L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions:
Unintended Consequences and Community Reentry, 9 JUST. RES. & POL’Y, no. 1,
2007, at 59, 63.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 64–65.
185
Id. at 66. The available data confirms reports that residence restrictions
greatly diminish housing availability. For example, researchers found, through the
use of geographical information system mapping technology, in one Florida county
that nearly 23% of the 137,944 properties zoned for residential use were located
within 1,000 feet of schools and nearly 64% fell within 2,500 feet, reducing the
number of available residences to 106,888 and 50,108, respectively. See Paul A.
Zandbergen & Timothy C. Hart, Reducing Housing Options for Convicted Sex
Offenders: Investigating the Impact of Residency Restriction Laws Using GIS, 8
JUST. RES. & POL’Y, no. 2, 2006, at 1, 18. When controlled for multiple types of
restrictions often employed in legislation (schools, parks, daycare centers, and bus
stops), the number of dwellings available for sex offenders was reduced to 4,233
within 1,000-feet buffer zones and thirty-seven within 2,500-feet buffer zones. Id.
186
Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender
Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 56 (2005); Richard Tewksbury,
Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Registration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST.
67, 76 (2005).
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loss of social relationships and the isolation of individuals.187
Researchers have noted that the laws appear to create obstacles
for reintegration, which may ultimately undermine goals related
to public protection.188
Beyond the significant tangible
consequences of registration and notification, the laws carry a
litany of other intangible consequences, with effects arguably
more restrictive on liberty than those just discussed. These
consequences are no less restrictive on a registrant’s liberty
interests. Sex offender registration requirements “raise the
likelihood—indeed, seek to ensure—that their subjects will be
expelled from everyday society. In contrast to being permitted to
live anonymously with their ex-offender status, registrants are
publicly and affirmatively singled out by the government as ‘sex
offenders,’ a distinctly odious label in contemporary America.”189
As a result, beyond the severe and tangible outcomes resulting
from vigilantism and harassment, offenders experience
banishment from their customary social, physical, and economic
worlds for life.190 According to Chief Judge Edward Becker of the
Third Circuit,

187
See Richard Tewksbury, Experiences and Attitudes of Registered Female Sex
Offenders, 68 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2004, at 30, 30–33 (discussing the negative
collateral consequences of sex offender registration including social stigmatization,
economic losses, and daily living challenges). Community notification includes
inclusion of offenders in a public database and direct mailings to individuals living
in the neighborhood.
188
See Jill S. Levenson et al., Megan’s Law and Its Impact on Community ReEntry for Sex Offenders, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 587, 593–99 (2007) (discussing the
negative collateral consequences of community notification policies, and
recommending policy changes that better inform the public about sex offenders
while minimizing the obstacles that interfere with community reintegration).
189
Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV.
147, 190 (2000). Arguments have been made to address this issue by citation to
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003). See, e.g., Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 23,
Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 17–3395). However,
reliance on this case is mistaken. In Smith, the Supreme Court examined sex
offender registration requirements of Megan’s Law as enacted in Alaska and
determined that the statute was not punitive, but civil in nature and therefore did
not violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 538 U.S. at 105–06. However,
in a later case, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that a similar statute at issue
was punitive. See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011).
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion when reviewing an
offender registration scheme in Michigan. See Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th
Cir. 2016).
190
See Snyder, 834 F.3d at 698 (discussing the effects of the Michigan sex
offender registration statute on registrants).
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[T]he burden imposed by the collective weight of all these effects
is borne by the offender in all aspects of his life. At worst, the
offender is literally cut off from any interaction with the wider
community. He is unable to find work or a home, cannot
socialize, and is subject to violence or at least the constant
threat of violence . . . . Although perhaps some people will hire
him or rent him a home, his social intercourse with others is all
but non-existent. The effects of notification permeate his entire
existence.191

Litigants have argued that Ohio’s sex offender registration “laws
impose a de facto (if not de jure) banishment, a restraint
manifestly not ‘shared by the public generally.’ ”192 For example,
in Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, the petitioner argued that exclusion
from society was more than a speculative or imagined harm.193
There, the petitioner was “banned from the school premises
which her daughter attend[ed]” and barred from attendance at
all school functions.194
She argued that interference with
parental duties was a restraint on liberty because it prevented
her from performing her parental duties.195
Despite these substantial infringements and restraints,
courts have rejected the claims that the burden of sex offender
laws amounts to custody.
Courts have dismissed these
restrictions as merely “collateral consequences,”196 as a “serious
nuisance,”197 as “remedial as opposed to punitive,”198 and as
designed to protect the public. Courts have analogized the
restrictions to the loss of voting rights,199 of a medical license,200
and of a driver’s license.201

191
E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
192
Logan, supra note 189, at 194 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,
240 (1963)).
193
See Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 189, at 11–12.
194
Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 20.
195
Id. at 27.
196
Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).
197
Hautzenroder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2018).
198
See Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2002). But see Doe v.
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that Michigan sex offender
registration laws were punitive and therefore violated the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution).
199
See Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987).
200
See id.
201
See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998).
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V. THE CASE FOR CUSTODY
A.

Circuit Court Precedent

In adjudicating the question regarding whether a sex
offender is in custody, courts generally cite to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jones v. Cunningham and discuss restraints
on liberty.202 Although courts have reached the same results—
that sex offender status does not qualify as custody—the
reasoning has been inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court has indicated in explicit terms that access to
habeas corpus is not to be restricted to “narrow,” “formalistic,” or
“static” interpretation.203 The habeas statute does not limit that
relief may be granted to those in physical custody. As the
Carafas v. LaVallee Court noted, the statute is “broad with
respect to the relief that may be granted.”204 “It provides that
‘[t]he court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice
require.’ ”205 Specifically, the Court has interpreted custody to
mean significant restraints on liberty of the type not shared by
the public.206 Despite the Supreme Court’s historically generous
approach to habeas access, lower courts have failed to discuss
this precedent in reaching their conclusions regarding custody
and sex offenders.207 While focusing on the concept of liberty,
lower courts have engaged in an ever-shifting discussion on
whether sex offender laws are punitive or remedial and whether
the restrictions imposed on sex offenders are collateral
consequences or part of the criminal sentence.208 As will be
discussed below, this analysis creates an inconsistent and
unrealistic body of law.
One issue that has permeated the analysis of custody as
applied to sex offenders, is courts’ reliance on precedent, which
involved examination of sex offender statutes that were not
reflective of those analyzed in the new case. Often courts’
conclusions belie the text of the statute at issue and the very real

202

See, e.g., Leslie, 296 F.3d at 523; Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183.
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
204
391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968).
205
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012)).
206
Jones, 371 U.S. at 242.
207
See supra Part III.
208
See, e.g., Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (10th Cir. 2016);
Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014); Leslie v.
Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 522–23 (6th Cir. 2002).
203
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liberty interests infringed by the sex offender restrictions.209
Courts generally cite to a series of cases across the circuits that
have declined to expand the definition of custody to individuals
under a sex offender registration law.210 The issue with this
analysis is that the statutory schemes at issue across the states
vary markedly in their restrictions and requirements. For
example, in Wilson v. Flaherty, the Fourth Circuit referenced a
unanimous body of precedent on the issue of custody as applied
to sex offenders.211 In Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, the Sixth Circuit
stated that “no court of appeals has held otherwise.”212
For another example, the Wisconsin statute in Virsnieks v.
Smith, on which the Wilson court relied, placed only “minimal
restrictions” on liberty through a requirement of location updates
that could be accomplished by mail and telephone.213 Based on
prior case law, the court concluded that the laws at issue did not
impose significant restraints, physical or otherwise.214 The
Washington state sex offender law, discussed in both Williamson
v. Gregoire and in Wilson, does not require the petitioner to
personally appear at a sheriff’s office to register because
registration can be accomplished by mail.215 The court in
Williamson specifically noted that the sex offender “law neither
targets [the offenders’] movement in order to impose special
requirements, nor does it demand his physical presence at any
time or place. Furthermore, the law does not specify any place in
Washington or anywhere else where [the offenders] may not

209
See Tina D. Santos, Note, Williamson v. Gregoire: How Much Is Enough? The
Custody Requirement in the Context of Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Statutes, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 457, 477–79 (1999).
210
See Bonser v. Dist. Att’y Monroe Cty., 659 F. App’x 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2016);
Dickey, 664 F. App’x at 693–94; Calhoun, 745 F.3d at 1073–74; Wilson v. Flaherty,
689 F.3d 332, 336, 338 (4th Cir. 2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 713–14 (7th
Cir. 2008); Leslie, 296 F.3d at 522; Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.
2001); McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Williamson
v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 1998).
211
Wilson, 689 F.3d at 337.
212
Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2018). But see Piasecki
v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 16-4175, 2019 WL 960003, at *7–9 (3rd Cir. Feb. 27,
2019) (finding that the sex offender requirements could support habeas corpus
jurisdiction because such requirements constituted “custody”).
213
Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719–20; see also Wilson, 689 F.3d at 337–38. Likewise,
in McNab v. Kok, the Ninth Circuit found that Oregon’s law does not place the
petitioner in custody because the law does not place restraint on physical liberty. See
170 F.3d at 1247.
214
Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719–20.
215
Wilson, 689 F.3d at 338; Williamson, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998).
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go.”216 Washington’s sex offender law is particularly troubling
because it is so drastically different from more recent sex
offender registration laws;217 however, courts continue to cite to
and rely upon it.218 In assessing these cases, it seems that if
specific restrictions lacking in Williamson were present in other
state statutes, then those conditions would qualify as custody.
All of these restrictions were present in the Ohio statute under
review in Hautzenroeder.219 There, the petitioner needed to
personally appear before the sheriff to register every ninety days;
could not establish her residence within 1,000 feet of a school,
day care, or preschool; and could not leave the jurisdiction for
more than three days without registering in the county to which
she traveled;220 however, courts have failed to extend the custody
analysis to petitioners subject to those restrictions and
requirements. For example, in McNab v. Kok, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed a statute from Oregon and rested upon prior
conclusions that the laws at issue did not impose significant
restraints, physical or otherwise.221 In contrast, the Washington
sex offender law did not require offenders to personally appear at
a sheriff’s office to register because registration could be
accomplished by mail.222
The requirements at issue in Calhoun v. Attorney General of
Colorado were much less restrictive than those discussed in
Wilson or cited to in Hautzenroeder.223 The requirements at issue
in Calhoun, under Colorado law, required a person convicted of a
qualifying sex offense to perform the following: (1) “appear
annually in person before the local sheriff to be photographed
and fingerprinted;” (2) “provide [a] physical address, place of
employment, vehicle information, and e-mail and other internet
identifiers;” and (3) “reregister within five days of any change.”224
216

151 F.3d at 1184.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.034, 2950.04, 2950.07 (West 2018).
The Ohio sex offender law contains all of the restrictions referenced in Williamson.
See 151 F.3d at 1183–84.
218
See, e.g., Wilson, 689 F.3d at 337–38.
219
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 17–18; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2950.034, 2950.04, 2950.07. Similar laws have been enacted elsewhere. See also
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-903, -906 to -907 (West 2018); Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334.
220
See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
221
170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also, Williamson, 151
F.3d at 1184.
222
Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184.
223
745 F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (10th Cir. 2014).
224
Id. at 1073.
217
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Furthermore, the sheriff must verify any changes in a qualified
convicted sex offender’s information.225 The Colorado statute
contained no residency restrictions or annual verification, unlike
Ohio’s required verification every ninety days—in two
jurisdictions for the petitioner in Hautzenroeder—as well as wide
public dissemination requirements.226
The statute at issue in Oklahoma more closely resembles the
statute in Ohio. In reviewing Oklahoma’s sex offender statute in
the context of the custody requirement, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that registrants were “free to live, work, travel,
associate, and engage in lawful activities without government
approval.”227 This finding is curious given the scope of the
In
requirements in the Oklahoma registration statute.228
Oklahoma, sex offenders are banned from living within 2,000 feet
of a school, “educational institution,” campsite used for children,
park, or child care facility.229 Registrants are also banned from
living in the same house together.230 Those subject to these
requirements are prohibited from loitering within 500 feet of a
school, child care center, playground, or park.231 Offenders are
required to register depending on how they have been
categorized.232 This registration requirement could be as often as
every ninety days for life.233 Registrants must apprise the sheriff,
in person, within three days of establishing a new residence,
changing jobs, or enrolling in school.234 The breadth of the
information registrants are required to disclose is expansive—as
are the dissemination protocols.235 Further, in Oklahoma certain
225

Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.06(B)(3) (West 2018).
227
Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693 (10th Cir. 2016). Although the
Tenth Circuit’s discussion does not discuss the details of the statute at length, the
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge does focus on the law. Dickey
v. Patton, No. Civ-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *2˗ 3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2015)
(report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10,
2015). The court appears to read a restriction on travel requirement into the custody
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is neither in the habeas statute, nor in
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at *3.
228
See generally OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1125 (West 2018); id. tit. 57,
§§ 581–590.2.
229
Id. § 590.
230
Id. § 590.1(A).
231
Id. tit. 21, § 1125(A)(1).
232
Id. tit. 57, § 583(C)–(D).
233
Id. §§ 583(C), 584(5)(c).
234
Id. § 583(F).
235
Id.
226
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classes of offenders are required to obtain a special driver’s
license identification card that is branded with the words “sex
offender.”236 Failure to comply with the statutory residency
requirements results in a felony charge carrying one to three
years in prison.237 A court’s finding that registrants are free to
work, travel, and engage in lawful activities without government
approval is contradicted by the requirements of the Oklahoma
registration statute.
As discussed above, many registrants are not free to live
where they choose and are restricted as to where and how they
can go about the other normal functions in their lives. The Third
Circuit analyzed the Pennsylvania statute in Bonser v. District
Attorney Monroe County.238 There, the court focused solely on the
duty to register.239
None of the other liberty restrictions
discussed above were present in that case. All of these cases,
routinely cited by courts, are distinguishable on the face of the
statutes.
In denying sex offender petitioners access to habeas review,
the circuit courts have cited to each other in reaching their
uniform determination that courts lack jurisdiction; however,
references to the realities of sex offender registration obligations
and restrictions call into question the courts’ conclusions. Sex
offender laws differ across the states: Many states impose
restrictions and requirements that significantly restrain an
individual’s liberty. Also, courts have failed to acknowledge the
social science research regarding the impact of sex offender
restrictions.
Reference to the actual requirements of the
particular statute at issue and an authentic evaluation of the
practicalities of the requirements are necessary in order to
achieve the justice envisioned by constitutional guarantees to
habeas corpus.
B. Collateral Consequences
In addition to the courts’ failure to consider the statutory
distinctions in the cases relied upon, the legal analysis around
the issue is a moving target. For example, the Ninth Circuit
found that the Washington state statute was “regulatory and not

236
237
238
239

Id. tit. 47, § 6-111(E).
Id. tit. 57, § 590(D).
659 F. App’x 126, 127 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 128–30.
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punitive,” signaling that this was a relevant consideration.240
The Tenth Circuit declared that Oklahoma’s statute was “not a
continuation of punishment.”241 In Leslie v. Randle, the Sixth
Circuit focused on the fact that the sex offender law at issue was
not punitive, but remedial.242 In denying the petitioner’s right to
habeas because the petitioner was not in custody, the court held
that the sex offender statute was a form of civil regulation.243 To
make this determination, the court relied on the interpretation of
the Ohio Supreme Court that the statute was remedial rather
than punitive.244
Subsequently, the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed State v. Cook after the legislature enacted a new, more
restrictive, sex offender registration and requirement statute.245
In State v. Williams, the court found that the sex offender law in
Ohio was punitive.246 While the Sixth Circuit acknowledged this
change in Hautzenroeder, it declined to change its position on the
issue of custody.247 Instead, the court in Hautzenroeder found the
petitioner’s appeal did not “hinge on the punitive nature of the
statute.”248 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination
of punitiveness was irrelevant because the issue in Williams was
whether the sex offender statute violated the ex post facto
clause.249
At other times, courts have determined that the sex offender
statute at issue was a collateral consequence of the conviction.250
Historically, Supreme Court precedent allowed that legal
consequences, which arose outside of the conviction, satisfied the
custody requirement;251 however, the Maleng v. Cook Court

240

Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998).
Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 694 (10th Cir. 2016).
242
296 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2002).
243
Id. at 523.
244
Id. at 522–23; see State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998) (holding
that the Ohio sexual-predator statute "serves the solely remedial purpose of
protecting the public" and that "there is no clear proof that [the statute] is punitive
in its effect.").
245
See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112–13 (Ohio 2011).
246
Id. at 1112.
247
Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737,744 (6th Cir. 2018).
248
Id.; see also Kerri L. Arnone, Note, Megan’s Law and Habeas Corpus Review:
Lifetime Duty with No Possibility of Relief, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 166–77 (2000)
(discussing the Court’s changing standards for custody determinations).
249
Hautzenroeder, 887 F.3d at 744.
250
Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 718 (7th Cir. 2008).
251
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1954); St. Pierre v.
United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943) (per curiam) (holding that requiring a person
241
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departed from this interpretation and determined certain
consequences of a conviction to be collateral, namely those that
are not part of a criminal conviction.252 Consequences such as the
loss of voting rights and the loss of the right to serve on a jury,
among others, do not satisfy the custody requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 2241.253 The Supreme Court explored this issue in
Maleng, finding that once a sentence has completely expired, the
collateral consequences of the conviction do not give rise to
custody.254
Collateral consequences are considered civil in
nature255 and have been defined as those that arise by operation
of law, and are thus outside the purview of the sentencing
court.256 Further, a person given an “unconditional discharge” is
no longer in custody.257 Also, a petitioner is not in custody simply
because of the potential that the prior conviction may be used to
enhance sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes of which
he is convicted.258 This is true because such “a habeas petitioner
suffers no present restraint from a conviction.”259 In contrast, a
to testify before the grand jury or be committed if he refuses satisfies the custody
requirement).
252
See 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam); see also El-Nobani v. United
States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A collateral consequence is one that
‘remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in which the
conviction was entered.’ ” (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st
Cir. 2000))).
253
El-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421; Lillios v. New Hampshire, 788 F.2d 60, 61 (1st
Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (concerning the denial of a driver's license); see also
Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (addressing the loss of a
professional license); Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95, 96–97 (7th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam); Ginsberg v. Abrams, 702 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Harvey v.
South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Edmunds v. Won Bae
Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing economic loss that resulted from a
conviction); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624–25 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
254
Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. The breadth of collateral consequences to which
criminal defendants can be subjected is broad, including permanent changes in legal
status, disenfranchisement, registration, community notification, ineligibility to
work or live in certain places, loss of professional licenses, and loss of child custody.
Professor Gabriel J. Chin has referred to these consequences as civil death. Gabriel
J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012). Given the rise in collateral consequences since
Maleng, it may be time to re-examine the Court’s position that collateral
consequences in general are an insufficient restraint on liberty to satisfy the custody
requirement.
255
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 254 (1980).
256
See El-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421.
257
See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491–92 (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,
237–38 (1968)).
258
Id. at 492.
259
Id.
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person like the parolee in Jones, whose release from physical
confinement under the sentence in question is not unconditional
and who faces ongoing restraints, may seek habeas relief.260
In making a determination that the sex offender designation
was a collateral consequence, neither the Fourth Circuit nor the
Sixth Circuit addressed the fact that the sex offender
requirements were part of the criminal sentence.261 Both the
Virginia statute and the Ohio statute required the sex offender
designation be imposed as part of the sentencing entry as a
condition precedent to the imposition of the obligation.262
Similarly, a recent Tenth Circuit case found that the sex offender
designation was a collateral consequence without discussion of,
or application to, the statute at issue in the case.263 But the
application of the collateral consequence doctrine to sex offender
registrants is not appropriate in all cases. In many states, sex
offender restraints and restrictions are part of the sentencing
entry and remain in the purview of the sentencing court. The
restrictions are not mere nuisances and cannot be analogized to
the loss of voting rights or the right to serve on a jury. A court’s
reliance on the collateral consequence analysis is no longer
suitable for many of these statutes.
C. Restraints on Liberty
Although the Supreme Court has described certain
consequences of a conviction as collateral, it has not held that
nonphysical restraints are irrelevant to the custody
determination. Substantial, but nonphysical, restraints on liberty
are relevant. The Carafas Court found that when a conviction
leaves a habeas petitioner in a position where “[h]e is suffering,
and will continue to suffer, serious disabilities,” such a person is
entitled to habeas consideration on the merits.264 The Carafas
Court went on to say that “[t]here is no need in the statute, the
Constitution, or sound jurisprudence for denying to [the]
260

See id. at 491 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)).
Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741–42 (6th Cir. 2018); Wilson v.
Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2012).
262
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.19(B)(3)(a) (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1903(B) (West 2018).
263
See Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693–94 (10th Cir. 2016); see also
Dickey v. Patton, No. CIV-15-685-M, 2015 WL 8592709, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Sept.
28, 2015) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2015 WL 8494009 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 10, 2015).
264
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968).
261
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petitioner his ultimate day in court.”265 Or, put another way, the
Great Writ “is not now and never has been a static, narrow,
formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand
purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their
right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liaberty
[sic].”266
Courts have recognized that while an individual’s custody
may begin when he is sent to prison, it extends beyond those
confines.
Where the state actively supervises a person’s
movements even though he is not physically restrained, “[h]e
cannot come and go as he pleases.”267 The thrust of the decision
in Jones is that the restrictions imposed on the petitioner
“significantly restrain [the] petitioner’s liberty to do those things
which in this country free men are entitled to do.”268 The courts
have affirmatively determined that persons released on their own
personal recognizance pending trial are in custody. While a
“parolee is generally subject to greater restrictions on his liberty
of movement than a person released on bail or his own
recognizance,”269 petitioners in the latter category nonetheless
remain in custody because their freedom “rests in the hands of
state judicial officers.”270 In Jones and Hensley v. Municipal
Court, the imposition on the petitioner’s free movement was
magnified by the state’s active oversight regime, including the
threat of future imprisonment.271 In both cases, the petitioners
were subject to rearrest for failure to appear as required.272
265

Id.
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
267
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
268
Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. In applying this understanding, the Court followed
the common law tradition that recognized liberty restraints to encompass both
physical imprisonment and substantial oversight by the state or a private party.
MATTHEW BACON WITH HENRY GWYLLIM & CHARLES EDWARD DODD, 4 A NEW
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 563 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1876). The
British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 provided that “any Sheriffe or Sheriffes Goaler
Minister or other Person whatsoever for any person in his or their Custody” could be
required to bring a “[p]artie soe committed or restrained” before a magistrate to
review the legality of his custody. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).
Habeas corpus thus has been used by a husband to win the release of his wife from
the supervision of her guardians, by a father seeking the release of his underage son
from the supervision of the military, and by guardians seeking the return of
wrongfully taken children. BACON ET AL., supra, at 570 (quoting United States v.
Anderson, 24 F. Cas 813 (C. C. D. Tenn. 1812) (No. 14, 449)).
269
Hensley, 411 U.S. at 348.
270
Id. at 351.
271
Id.; Jones, 371 U.S. at 241–43.
272
See Hensley, 411 U.S. at 348; Jones, 371 U.S. at 242.
266
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Similarly, many sex offender registrants are subject to rearrest
and face potential prison time for failing to comply with the sex
offender registration requirements.273 A unanimous Court in
Jones focused the inquiry on whether the petitioner faced
restraints on liberty “because of his conviction and sentence,
which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon the
In determining whether restrictions
public generally.”274
associated with parole satisfy the custody requirement, the Court
considered both physical and nonphysical restrictions:
restrictions on travel; permission to drive a car; “periodical[]
report[s]” to a parole officer; and the “admonish[ment] to keep
good company and good hours, work regularly, keep away from
undesirable places, and live a clean, honest, and temperate
life.”275 The Court also emphasized the threat of criminal
consequences for non-compliance.276
Although the Supreme Court and lower courts have
determined that probation, parole, and release on bond awaiting
trial all satisfy the requirements of the habeas statute, many of
the sex offender registration schemes enacted by state statute
impose a more significant restraint on liberty; indeed, the Sixth
Circuit examined a substantially similar registration scheme in
the state of Michigan and made significant findings.277
Specifically, that Court found that the sex offender registration
law at issue resembled the “punishment of parole/probation.”278
The Sixth Circuit relied on a previous Supreme Court case that
seriously considered the claim that an Alaska statute resembled
parole/probation although that statute involved nothing more
than reporting requirements.279 The Court acknowledged the
argument had some force, but concluded that it was ultimately
dissimilar because, unlike parolees, “offenders subject to the
[Alaska statute] are free to move where they wish and to live and
work as other citizens, with no supervision.”280 In reviewing a
273
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950(f) (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1900 (West 2018).
274
Jones, 371 U.S. at 242.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 703 (6th Cir. 2016). While this case involved the
determination that the Michigan sex offender registration statute is punitive and,
thus, cannot be applied retroactively, it is instructive in analyzing this Court’s
discussion regarding the statute’s severe restraints on liberty. Id. at 701–03.
278
Id. at 702–03.
279
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003).
280
Id.
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more recent sex offender law in Michigan, the Sixth Circuit drew
a contrast to the Alaska law.281 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit
noted:
registrants [in Michigan] [were] subject to numerous
restrictions on where they can live and work and, much like
parolees, they must report in person, rather than by phone or
mail. Failure to comply can be punished by imprisonment, not
unlike a revocation of parole. And while the level of individual
supervision is less than is typical of parole or probation, the
basic mechanism and effects have a great deal in common. In
fact, many of the plaintiffs have averred that [the sex offender
statute’s] requirements are more intrusive and more difficult to
comply with than those they faced when on probation.282

Many states have statutes that reflect the very regulatory
oversight described.
For example, the Ohio sex offender
registration scheme restrains a petitioner’s liberty to choose
where to live.283 A designated sex offender is prohibited from
establishing a residence or occupying residential premises within
1,000 feet of school premises, day cares, or preschools.284 This
limits a petitioner’s freedom of movement in the most
fundamental way, restricting her habitation to certain segments
of society. This restriction is far greater than that imposed on
probationers or those awaiting trial who are free to decide where
to establish their residence.
In most legislative schemes, registration is compulsory and
violators are subject to substantial prison time for failure to
register.285 In Ohio, those subject to the law must register in
person with the sheriff of the county in which they reside, work,
and go to school every ninety days for life.286 If a petitioner were
to work in one county, live in another and go to school in a third
that would require three visits to separate sheriff’s offices every
ninety days. As one judge noted, the practical implications of
this requirement amount to a “continuing, intrusive, and
humiliating regulation of the person himself.”287 In-person

281

Snyder, 834 F.3d at 703.
Id.
283
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034(A) (West 2018).
284
Id.
285
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-901, -902, -903, -904, 18.2-472.1 (West 2018).
286
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.11(D)(2) (West 2018).
287
Doe v. Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring)
("To require registration of persons not in connection with any particular activity
asserts a relationship between government and the individual that is in principle
282
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reporting requirements dictate that the offender must appear in
particular places at particular times; this requirement is
indicative of those requirements imposed on probationers and
parolees.288 The impact of these restrictions should be discussed
and acknowledged by the courts analyzing the issue of custody.
As noted by Professor Logan, a scholar in ciminal law, criminal
procedure, and sentencing, “[t]he constant necessity to apprise
law enforcement of one’s whereabouts under threat of
prosecution represents a unique encumbrance, which chills
registrants’ freedom of movement, affecting temporary visits to
other jurisdictions and most certainly permanent moves.”289
Furthermore, the right to travel is a fundamental right.290
Under many registration laws, offenders may not leave the
county for more than three days without registering in person
with the county where they travel, further restricting their
freedom of movement.291 “It is inconceivable to think that one
who must, as his first act, go to local law enforcement and
announce that he is a felon convicted of a sex offense will not be
deterred from moving in order to avoid divulging that
ignominious event.”292 The Supreme Court has recognized that a

quite alien to our traditions, a relationship which when generalized has been the
hallmark of totalitarian government.").
288
See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (discussing the
requirement in the context of a defendant, who was in custody, released on his own
recognizance pending imposition of a sentence and who was obligated to appear at
times and places ordered by the court); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242–43
(1963) (stating that a parolee, who was in custody, “must periodically report” to a
parole officer).
289
Logan, supra note 189, at 184–85.
290
See, e.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417–19 (1981) (describing cases about
the right, and stating that it is “well settled that the right of a United States citizen
to travel from one State to another and to take up residence in the State of his
choice” is constitutionally protected and that the right’s “fundamental nature has
consistently been recognized”); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 254–55
(1974) (“The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic
constitutional freedom.”).
291
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1905 (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-302 (West 2018) (within three days). See
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 2018) (within five days); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1622-108 (West 2018) (within five days).
292
State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Agid, J.,
dissenting); cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (identifying the
" ‘right to remove from one place to another according to inclination’ as ‘an attribute
of personal liberty’ protected by the Constitution." (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179
U.S. 270, 274 (1900))). See generally Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the
Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification
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substantial burden on movement might be so severe as to create
“custody” for habeas purposes, even in the absence of an outright
prohibition on movement.293
Despite this infringement on
registrants’ liberty interests, courts have failed to acknowledge
this reality in assessing the impact of sex offender laws.294
Parental rights and the parent-child relationship are also
fundamental liberty interests.295 Many sex offender registration
schemes contain presence restrictions, which prohibit offenders
from entering schools, parks, playgrounds, or other locations
where children are likely to be present.296 While serving to limit
a registrant’s freedom of movement to areas that free people are
allowed to visit, these restrictions are also severe restraints on
fundamental liberty interests individuals have in parenting their
children. Even in states where presence restrictions are not
written into the statute, offenders are banned from certain
locations by the rules of the organization or institution.297

Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167 (1999) (discussing generally the similar
impact of community notification laws).
293
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (recognizing that a financial
disincentive to move can implicate the fundamental right to travel).
294
See, e.g., Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2018) (failing to
discuss the requirement under Ohio law that registrants must register within three
days of entering a new jurisdiction).
295
E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“[F]reedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest . . . .”); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects “the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home[,] and bring up
children, . . . .”); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 612 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“We have . . . been vigilant in ensuring that government does not
burden the ability of parent and child to sustain their vital connection” because their
relationship is fundamental to family life).
296
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-17 (2018) (prohibiting adult sex offenders
convicted for sex offenses involving a minor from “loitering” within 500 feet of a
school, child care facility, playground, park, athletic field or facility, school bus stop,
college or university, or any child-focused business); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-132 to
134 (West 2018) (prohibiting certain offenders from knowingly entering swimming
areas and playgrounds in state parks, local government operated water parks, and
in certain circumstances, public schools); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 626.81, 3053.8. (West
2018) (prohibiting registrants from entering schools without permission and
parolees with convictions involving minors under 14 from entering parks without
permission); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112 (West 2018) (stating that sex offenders
may not reside or loiter within 500 feet of school property).
297
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 132, at 20 (arguing that the petitioner was
banned from the premises of her daughter’s school).
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In sum, sex offenders often face more substantial restraints
on liberty than persons on parole or probation, who, since Jones,
are routinely held to be in custody;298 indeed, even persons with
more limited and transitory restraints on liberty have been held
“in custody.” For example, the Third Circuit found that a person
sentenced to community service was in custody, notwithstanding
the following: a lack of continual supervision; a three-year period
in which to complete the sentence; options as to type and hours of
service; and no threat of incarceration for non-performance.299
The Ninth Circuit found that an individual sentenced to fourteen
hours at an alcohol rehabilitation program, which could be
scheduled over several days, satisfied the custody requirement
because it required petitioner’s “physical presence at a particular
place.”300 Sex offender registration laws limit where offenders
can live and where they can go, and these laws require their
presence at the sheriff’s office on a regular basis for life.301 The
extension of reporting requirements from a fixed period of time to
a lifetime obligation is one example of how the increasingly
pervasive and severe restraints on sex offenders go beyond the
restraints imposed on probationers and parolees for other crimes.
V. REMEDIES
Courts’ unwillingness to acknowledge the realities of the sex
offender requirements creates an untenable condition for
offenders seeking relief from those restrictions. The only means
298
See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240–43 (1963). Others have argued
this position and called upon the courts to reevaluate the application of the custody
requirement in light of the realities of the actual liberty restraints imposed by sex
offender registration requirements. See Kimberley A. Murphy, Note, The Use of
Federal Writs of Habeas Corpus to Release the Obligation To Report Under State Sex
Offender Statutes: Are Defendants “in Custody” for Purposes of Habeas Corpus
Review?, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 513, 517–18, 541 (arguing that sex offenders
should be able to use federal habeas review to attack sex offender registration
requirements); Santos, supra note 209, at 459 (arguing that the court erred in
holding that a petitioner subject to Washington's sex offender registration was not
"in custody" for habeas purposes).
299
See, e.g., Barry v. Bergen Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161–62 (3d Cir.
1997).
300
Dow v. Circuit Court, 995 F.2d 922, 922–23 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
301
For example, in Ohio the law was amended from a regiment that required
registration for a specific number of years and/or that allowed offenders to petition
for release from the requirements to a system that required compliance with the
restrictions and registration requirements for life. See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d
1108, 1115–17 (Ohio 2011) (O’Donnell, J., dissenting) (discussing revisions to the
statutory scheme and finding the new statute to be punitive rather than remedial).
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left available to sex offenders seeking habeas relief to attack the
conviction is to violate the terms of the sex offender registration
requirement, which establishes a new conviction and a new
prison or probation sentence.302 The Ninth Circuit determined
that a “habeas petitioner is ‘in custody’ for the purposes of
challenging an earlier, expired rape conviction, when he is
incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender
registration law because the earlier rape conviction ‘is a
necessary predicate’ to the failure to register charge.”303 Not only
does this undermine judicial economy and finality of convictions
that the Court has espoused as important considerations, but
also it violates notions of fundamental fairness.
This is
especially true in cases like Wilson v. Flaherty where the
petitioner has demonstrated claims of actual innocence.304 The
petitioner in Wilson aptly characterized this result as a
“Kafkaesque regime” where a potentially innocent petitioner is
only permitted to challenge the burdens of a sex offender statute
by committing a new crime.305 As the legal analysis is currently
positioned, this is the only avenue available to individuals under
a sex offender registration law.
Courts created a legal fiction to address the issue.306 The
legal fiction would treat sex offender registration requirements
as terms of probation and extend habeas review to petitioners.307
This resolution was offered in the wake of the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Wilson as a way to bring habeas claims of actual
innocence within the purview of the court and to avoid the unjust
result in that case.308 While this solution would be feasible, the
author notes that the Supreme Court has expressly declined to
allow for the use of legal fiction in the context of habeas
litigation.309

302

See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. But see Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (holding that
previous convictions used to enhance a new sentence could not be used to attack a
federal sentence enhancement where the petitioner was no longer in custody under
the previous convictions); Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001).
304
Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2012).
305
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Wilson, 689 F.3d 332 (No. 12-986).
306
Recent Case, Wilson v. Flaherty, supra note 150, at 2105.
307
Id. at 2111.
308
Id. at 2105.
309
Id. at 2111 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963)).
303
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This conundrum could be resolved by action on the part of
the legislature. Congressional action could be taken to expand
the definition of custody and the jurisdictional reach of the
federal courts. The revised statute could explicitly include
certain types of sex offender registration schemes in the
definition of custody; however, this approach may be as
inadvisable as it is unlikely. Given the ever-changing scope and
reach of sex offender laws and legal consequences of convictions,
determinations about what precisely satisfies the requirement
may be properly left in the hands of courts. Also, considering the
legislature’s demonstrated desire to limit access to habeas relief
for state petitioners, coupled with the inability of the legislature
as it is currently constituted to pass meaningful legislation, this
resolution appears to be a futile one.310
The most reasonable solution is that courts acknowledge the
real restrictions and requirements of many states’ sex offender
laws. The current practice of citing to precedent that contains
legislation, which is materially different from that before the
court, results in incongruous and unjust results. Social science
researchers, legal commentators, practitioners and those
subjected to these laws have provided data and analysis to
demonstrate that sex offender designation laws are more than a
mere nuisance.
Using the framework established by the
Supreme Court in Jones v. Cunningham, and its progeny, courts
can and should recognize the very real similarities between
probation, parole, and sex offender requirements. The lifetime
restraints on liberty for the sex offender designee are more
burdensome than those suffered by individuals required to
perform community service or to attend alcohol rehabilitation
classes, and courts should recognize them as such.
CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence created by the federal circuit courts has
failed to keep pace with the constantly changing sex offender
statutes. These statutes have consistently evolved in a direction
that is more punitive, wider in scope, and of a longer duration.
The majority of the circuit courts’ current application of the
310

See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 10–11, 55–56 (2010) (discussing AEPDA implementation and implications);
Dina Titus, Is Congress the “Broken Branch” of Government?, 49 POL. SCI. & POL.
490, 493–94 (2016) (arguing that increasing partisanship prevents congressional
action generally).
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custody requirement to sex offender registrants is incompatible
with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of custody and ignores
the reality of the restraints imposed by sex offender legislation.
The restrictions and obligations imposed on registrants are
burdensome and have significant restraints on their liberty
interests. This condition satisfies the jurisdictional requirement
of custody, and those laboring under these designations should
have access to federal review.

